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D
ebate over the legal regulation of ob­
scenity and pornography tends to be 
highly principled, in two senses. It is 
principled in that it appeals to a small 
number of general concepts which are supposed 
to form the rational grounds on which legal 
regulation is or is not legitimate. And it is princi­
pled in the sense that those who claim to have 
access to such general concepts comport them­
selves as principled persons, speaking in the name
o morality or pleasure on behalf of humanity, 
ere is no shortage of such principled argument,
on both sides of the debate over whether pub­
lished erotica should be open to legal regulation. 
Many liberals have argued that legal restrictions 
on non-violent erotica are an infringement of 
indivi uals’ rights to freely pursue theirown sexual 
development or, in the American context, of the 
principle of freedom of expression. Some femi­
nists, however, have countered by invoking an­
other right: the right of women to be represented 
in a manner that does justice to their full human­
ity, rather than in the caricatural forms spun-off 
to satisfy the male imagination.
Liberals tend to 
take the high 
moral ground 
against the 
censorship of 
pornography. 
Ian Hunter 
suggests this 
moral high 
ground may be 
a bit shaky. 
Governing 
pornography is 
a more 
complex 
business than 
the partisans in 
the censorship 
debate allow.
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The ensuing debate has been notable more 
for the indignation it has fuelled than for the 
insight it has provided, as is typically the case 
when contestants imagine themselves to be the 
principled champions of competing moral abso­
lutes. In the course of researching and writing On 
Pornography with David Saunders and Dugald 
Williamson, it became increasingly clear to us 
that these attempts to provide a principled analy­
sis of obscenity law were both historically inaccu­
rate and ethically inappropriate. Drawing on that 
book, I want to argue here that such principled 
argument has long since outlived both its fruitful­
ness as a way of understanding how obscenity law 
actually works and its usefulness as a means of 
educating public opinion. I will argue that the 
legal regulation of obscenity neither is nor can be 
based on general concepts. As a result, we must 
learn to comport ourselves in a far less principled 
manner, if we wish to participate in a discussion 
that has any bearing on the way in which the 
policing of pornography affects our modes of 
conduct.
Most of the publ ic debate over pornography is 
organised by three interlocking principles: those 
of harm, representation and private freedom. 
These principles play an important role in the 
feminist case for greater legal regulation of por­
nography, but as they are more familiar to us in 
liberal and libertarian arguments for deregulation 
I will concentrate on this latter use of them.
Liberal moral and political philosophy holds 
that obscenity law— like otherforms of law—can 
be reformed through an analysis of the rational 
and moral principles on which it is or should be 
based, followed by its reconstruction in accord­
ance with the clarified principles. The classic 
modem example of this approach is the Report of 
the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship 
(1979) chaired by the British moral philosopher 
Bernard Williams, a report which is resolutely 
representative of liberal philosophical argument 
on obscenity law.
It begins by enunciating the ‘harm principle’ 
of legal regulation in its classical form. Accord­
ing to this principle, if freedom is to be pre­
served— as the necessary condition of individual 
self-development—then individuals must have 
the right to conduct themselves as they choose, 
except for those forms of conduct that infringe 
the rights of other individuals and thereby harm 
them. Then this principle is applied to published 
erotica, and it is here that a second principle— 
that of representation— is called on. Erotic ait 
and pornography consist of representations or 
ideas which, while they may be morally offensive 
to some individuals, cannot harm them. Given 
this, individuals must be free to produce, dissemi­
nate and consume such representations, just in 
case they contain the true (but socially unpopu­
lar) form of our sexual self-development.
One exception to this rule is allowed, for a 
special class of pornographic representations. This 
is reserved for pictorial depictions of sex whose 
explicitness is such that they offend or excite in 
a coercive manner, infringing the subject’s ca­
pacity and right to entertain or reject them at 
will, and thereby threatening to cross the border 
from ideas to actions. The Williams Report rec­
ommends not that such specially offensive repre­
sentations be banned—even they might contain 
a glimmer of our sexual truth—but that they be 
restricted, to mature volunteer audiences con­
suming them in private. The space of individual 
private freedom—whose boundaries are marked 
here by the bedroom door and the adults-only 
book or video shop— thus represents an absolute 
or principled limit, beyond which it is rationally 
and morally illegitimate for the state or the law to 
encroach.
There are many comments that one might 
make on this attempt to subordinate legal ration­
ality and regulation to the ‘higher’ principles of 
philosophical analysis. Given the constraints of 
space I will content myself with one. Each of the 
three principles mentioned above— of harm, rep­
resentation and private freedom—presupposes 
that human beings are subjects defined by indi­
vidual possession of the capacity for free rational 
and moral self-development. It is this capacity 
that justifies the harm principle. All ‘externally 
imposed’ doctrine and regulation is relegated in 
favour of the ‘right’ to the free individual exercise 
of reason and moral judgement—which includes 
the right to free expression—as long as this doesn’t 
infringe the rights possessed by other individuals.
Further, it is the presumed possession of this 
capacity that justifies liberals in viewing pornog­
raphy as a matter of (harmless) representations or 
ideas, given to a moral personality able to enter­
tain or reject them at will, through the exercise of 
rational judgement. Finally, the figure of the 
rational subject justifies a degree of legal regula­
tion (of representations whose pornographic of­
fensiveness makes them coercive) but also limits 
this regulation (to the public sphere, where it 
protects only the immature and the unadventur­
ous). In criticising each of the above three 
principles it is this figure of the free self-develop­
ing subject that I am aiming at.
The liberal attempt to achieve a deregulatory 
reform of obscenity law on the basis of the prin­
ciples of ‘harm to others’, representation and 
private freedom is confronted by a number of 
problems. The first relates to the attempt to use 
the harm principle as an instrument for setting 
general limits to legal regulation. Clearly this 
principle must be capable of specifying harm at a 
general level, independently of particular types 
of harm (such as the harm of obscene publica-
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tion). After all, the harm principle is supposed to 
provide general criteria for deciding whether 
such particular ‘harms’ are indeed harmful. As a 
number of writers have pointed out, however, 
this presupposed generality of the harm principle 
is not particularly plausible.
In the case of affirmative action and equal 
opportunity legislation, for example, it is implau­
sible to suggest that the harm associated with 
discriminatory employment practices could be 
specified independently of particular social poli­
cies: namely, those aimed at increasing the pro­
portion of women or other minority groups in the 
professions. But if this is the case then what is to 
count as harm will be determined by the norms, 
practices and objectives of particular policy do­
mains or institutional settings. Such local 
determinations of harm will not be subject to 
philosophical adjudication by the general harm 
principle, which must be seen simply as a mis­
leading puree of specific historical calculations of 
harm.
This explains why abortion law is so resistant 
to a ‘rights-based’ philosophical rectification. 
Here the law does not and cannot use the harm 
principle to set an absolute criterion for legal 
intervention or for legal deregulation, based (re­
spectively) on the fetus’ absolute right to life, or 
on the mother’s absolute right to control her 
reproductive capacities. Instead, it has delegated 
tthe determination of what is to count as harm (to 
the mother’s mental and physical well-being) to 
medical expertise—an expertise informed in this 
instance by quite mundane calculations regard­
ing the social and personal costs of an illicit 
abortion industry. Rights don’t come into it and, 
given the threat to social peace posed by compet­
ing moral zealotries, this is probably a good thing.
The same logic applies to the so-called ‘de­
prave and corrupt’ test, the legal specification of 
the harm of obscene publication that emerged in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. This 
was arrived at in the context of wider governmen­
tal policies and campaigns of moral reform. The 
object of these policies and campaigns was to 
regulate the circulation of pornography, con­
ceived of as an agent capable of perversely affect­
ing the moral conducts and capacities of vulner­
able sectors of the population. It was as a means 
of pursuing this social objective that the harms of 
obscene publication were determined, not be­
cause pornography was thought to be a threat to 
free self-developing subjectivity.
Our historians of sexuality have done us no 
service in ascribing the 19th century medical 
problematisation of pornography to sexually re­
pressed middle-class men, for whose sins William 
Acton has been forced to run the gauntlet of 
humanist indignation and historical wish-fulfil- 
ment. Listen instead to the voice of Elizabeth
Blackwell, advocate of Christian socialism and 
women’s rights, speaking to us from 1879 through 
her influential manual, Counsel to Parents: On the 
Moral Education of their Children in Relation to Sex:
The dangers arising from vicious literature 
of any kind, cannot be overestimated by 
parents. Whether sensuality be taught by 
police reports, or by Greek and Latin litera­
ture, by novels, plays, songs, penny papers, 
or any species of the corrupt literature now 
sent forth broadcast, and which finds its 
way into the hands of the young of all 
classes and both sexes, the danger is equally 
real... No amount of simple caution, given 
by parents or instructors, suffices to guard 
the young mind from the influence of evil 
literature . .. The permanent and incalcu­
lable injury which is done to the young 
mind by vicious reading, is proved by all 
that we know about the structure and meth­
ods of the human mind... These important 
facts have a wide and constant bearing on 
education, showing the really poisonous 
character of all licentious literature .. .and 
its destructive effect on the quality of the 
brain.
In fact, despite her reference to ‘the young of 
all classes and both sexes’, Blackwell was prima­
rily concerned with the effects of pornography on 
middle-class boys. The language of moral physi­
ology is really a disguised instrument of ethical 
pedagogy, designed to pathologise not sex in 
general, but masculine auto-erotic gratification— 
something that Blackwell believed was intensi­
fied by the ‘solitary vice’ of pornography and 
robbed women of sexual pleasure and conjugal 
intimacy. No doubt there are some to whom 
Elizabeth Blackwell’s campaign to improve het­
erosexual mutuality will seem an absurd anachro­
nism. Yet she was quite representative of the 
struggle to improve women’s lot in marriage; and 
the stigmatisation of pornography as an agency of 
male sexual selfishness remains an important part 
of the women’s movement, albeit not of its more 
florid and cultic fringes.
Of course, it eventually became possible to 
laugh at the language of moral physiology, a 
language that in the mid-nineteenth century 
described pornography as a social toxin, causing 
pathological effects in the social and personal 
body. But to ridicule this language in order to 
demonstrate the harmlessness of erotica, in the 
name of a less repressed and more knowledgeable 
modernity, is to miss the point. The objective of 
regulating access to pornography as an instru­
ment of moral malformation remains current, 
even if this harm is now spoken of in languages 
other than the one that first specified the harm of
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depravity and corruption.
Today, the harm of pornography is more 
likely to be specified in terms of an optimal 
pedagogical formation of the young, and in terms 
of the civic and occupational harms caused to 
women by their public eroticisation. The fact 
that liberal political and moral philosophy pre­
sumes to sit in judgement on these local calcula­
tions of harm— insisting that while pornography 
may be morally offensive it is not harmful— may 
be a sign of the limits of its principled analysis. To 
see why, we need to turn to liberalism’s second 
general concept, representation.
Liberalism is convinced that pornography is 
harmless because it assumes that pornography 
consists of representations or ideas, and that the 
subject of these ideas possesses the rational and 
moral capacity to entertain or reject them at will. 
While some individuals might be offended by 
pornographic representat ions they, by definition, 
cannot be harmed by them, and erotic ideas must 
enjoy free circulation in liberal societies. But, as 
we have noted, the principle of representation is 
not applied with absolute consistency. The 
Williams Report identifies certain erotic repre­
sentations which are so offensive and/or arous­
ing—due to their ‘photographic’ explicitness— 
that they threaten to ‘coerce’ the capacity for 
judgement and thereby forfeit the free circula­
tion accorded to ideas.
It soon becomes apparent, however, that this 
notion of a special class of coercive ideas is 
neither more nor less than a modem philosophi­
cal variation on the old notion of morally patho­
logical representations. In both cases what is in 
fact being alluded to is a particular use of pornog­
raphy and the moral incompetence of its users. 
This implicit tying of harms to uses and types of 
user opens the door to two sets of facts which are 
incompatible with liberal principles, but which 
lie at the heart of the legal regulation of obscen­
ity.
First, it allows us to see that pornography is 
not a representation of sex but a particular prac­
tice of sex using representations. The standard 
histories suggest that erotica and pornography are 
timeless attempts to represent the truth of sex, 
perhaps distorted by epochs of sexual fear and 
repression. Recent scholarship, however, sug­
gests that pornography in the modem sense first 
emerged in the seventeenth century, as a result of 
the unexpected overlapping of a particular spir­
itual discipline and anovel communications tech­
nology.
The spiritual discipline was the technique of 
sexual confession. In the French historian Michel 
Foucault’s path-breaking account, confession is 
not a repression of sexuality. Rather, it is an 
apparatus that uses repression as a technique for 
creating a particular sense and reality of sexual­
ity— one in which the practitioner relates to his 
orherdesire as enigmatic, hidden, silenced: hence 
as something that must be endlessly interpreted, 
revealed, liberated, spoken of. It was from this 
spiritual ‘practice of the self— in which access to 
pleasure was tied to the forms in which desire was 
interpreted and spoken of—that modem pornog­
raphy first emerged.
Pornography emerged— initially as a highly 
specialised practice for a stratum of male erotic 
virtuosi—as a profane improvisation on the con­
fessional interpretation of desire as the hidden 
truth of the self. Early modem pornography was 
a coded practice of reading and writing through 
which certain individuals could obtain pleasure 
from their bodies through the manner in which 
they probed them to uncover the erotic truth 
about themselves.
And it was the dissemination of this perverse 
discourse of the flesh, through the technology of 
the printed book, that was responsible for a shift 
in its regulation. The social scale and power of 
printed erotica required that its regulation move 
from the religious to the secular courts. This 
occurred in 1727, when Edmund Curll became 
the first individual to be convicted of the unprec­
edented common law crime of obscene publica­
tion. What convinced the judges that Curll’s 
offence was a crime rather than a sin, was the 
printed character of the work—Venus in the Clois­
ter, or the Nun in her Smock—which ‘allowed it to 
go all over the kingdom’.
Pornographic books are not therefore simply 
a convenient means of circulating erotic ideas. 
Sex and the book are far more intimately related 
than this, as pornography is in fact a biblioerotics 
or ‘book sex’. Pornography is thus not a represen­
tation of real sexual practice, but a r£al practice of 
sex using representations. The production and 
consumption of pornography does not therefore 
consist in a parade of ideas floating past the 
rational subject. It is rather aproblematic species 
of social conduct (part perverse spiritual disci­
pline, part profitable commercial activity) the 
question of whose harm can in no way be settled 
by simply appealing to the principle of represen­
tation.
The second set of facts inconvenient for lib­
eral principles concerns the particular and vari­
able nature of moral competence. Liberal moral 
philosophy posits an individual subject who (once 
a rather uncertain threshold of maturity has been 
crossed) is presumed rationally and morally capa­
ble of judging presented ideas. If one accepts, 
however, that pornography transmits not ideas 
but a set of instruments and practices for cultivat­
ing autoerotic sensibilities and conducts, then 
the notion of a general moral personality capable 
of rationally accepting or rejecting pornography 
becomes untenable.
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Seen in this light the individual is not the 
bearer of a unitary moral personality. Rather, the 
individual is the human platform for a variety of 
historical ways of conducting the self—formed 
and maintained through disparate ethical 
trainings and ethical institutions. Ethical com­
petence is thus not an all-or-nothing affair, but 
varies with category of person, social setting and 
cultural level. It is for this reason that obscenity 
law generally does not seek to ban publications 
outright on the grounds of intrinsic obscenity. 
Instead, it attempts to administer a variable ac­
cess to them, on the basis of categories of vulner­
able consumers and problematic consumptions. 
Thus, historically, a work sold cheaply on the 
streets near schools might be obscene; whereas 
the same work sold to an educated public in a 
scholarly edition might not be.
The standard liberal philosophical view of 
obscenity law as a repressive policing of unpopu­
lar but harmless ideas is thus historically inaccu­
rate and morally inept. Obscenity law is not an 
attempt to censor or repress pornography but to 
regulate its consumption. It forms part of a social 
programme (however successful) aimed at regu­
lating access to pornography as a morally danger­
ous commodity on the basis of a sliding scale of 
moral competence. The censorship classification 
table for films and videos is a particular instance 
of this scale. Here, degrees of moral competence 
are aligned with age— though this is not always 
so. In the case of pedophile pornography it is 
adult males who may be declared morally incom­
petent, given certain circumstances of consump­
tion and use.
Like liberalism, the legal regulation of por­
nography also determines thresholds beyond 
which the law should not pass. Unlike liberalism 
it does not attempt to establish an absolute de­
marcation between the sphere of law and that of 
morality, based on the principles of harm and 
representation. Instead it operates a far more 
sophisticated floating threshold of legal inter­
vention. This threshold treats the capacity for 
moral self-regulation not as a native endowment 
of the moral personality but as an ethical ability, 
unevenly distributed in populations depending 
on their systems of education, policing and wel­
fare.
For this reason there can be no principled 
distinction between a public sphere of legal regu­
lation and a private sphere of moral freedom. The 
right to conduct oneself as one chooses in private 
is not an absolute one, guaranteed by the freedom 
of conscience acting within the limits of the harm 
principle. Rather, it is a right contingent upon 
specific social and ethical circumstances—or, in 
fact, on the social distribution of the disposition 
to choose certain conducts rather than others.
Private freedom in this area of life is in effect
a civil status conferred on those possessing the 
capacity to conduct themselves within the so­
cially defined norms of moral competence. For 
this reason, there are some forms of conduct— 
such as rape in marriage or the consumption of 
pedophile pornography—which are never pri­
vate, whether they take place behind the bed­
room door or not. This is not because such 
conducts infringe the general principle of ‘harm 
to others’. Rather, it is because they are deemed 
harmful within the ethical and legal contexts 
formed by particular moral reform campaigns or 
governmental social programmes. The campaign 
to de-eroticise women in the workplace, for ex­
ample, may provide the moral context in which 
the display of pin-ups in locker-rooms is deemed 
harmful, in which locker-rooms lose their pri­
vacy, and in which their inhabitants are required 
to develop new moral competences and con­
ducts.
At such moments it ill becomes intellectuals 
to stand on principle. There is something 
unedifying in the repetitious theatrics of the 
liberal public conscience, where intellectuals 
purport to show the harmlessness of erotica and to 
defend the freedom of sexual expression, speak­
ing in the name of philosophical principles that 
are presumed to stand above the complex 
mundanity of the legal system. By parity of argu­
ment, the same goes for those analyses—equally 
contemptuous of legal rationality—which pur­
port to show the harmfulness of pornography by 
treating it as an infringement of women’s right to 
be represented in a ‘fully human’ manner.
If the preceding account is correct then the 
production and consumption of erotica is, intrin­
sically, neither harmless nor harmful. If the harm 
of pornography is indeed relative to the variable 
moral competences of its consumers, determined 
by the norms of particular moral campaigns and 
social programs, then it is our relation to these 
campaigns and programs that must determine our 
attitude to pornography. Under these condi­
tions, for intellectuals to invoke the usual princi­
ples, and defend the right to freedom of expres­
sion, amounts to a failure to confront the actual 
circumstances of their own ethical and legal 
obligations. And, for once, it is true to say that 
this posture is particularly suspect when it is 
adopted by men. They are, after all, defending a 
problematic cultivation of their bodies and 
minds. ■
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